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The enigma is that place as such is intuitive with-
out being intuitable as such. 
 
John Sallis, Topographies 
 
 
Here the anaphora “as” does not refer to a pre-
ceding referential term (to a prelinguistic sub-
stance), and “such” does not serve to indicate a 
referent that gives “as” its meaning. “Such” has no 
other existence than “as,” and “as” has no other 
essence than “such.” 
 
Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community 
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PREFACE. 
 
NOTE TOWARD A THEORY OF THE MILITANT 
 
f 
 
 
After all, revolution is one of the half-dozen topics 
in this world worth writing about and the least 
miserable, even in the face of defeat.1 
 
“Either ethics makes no sense at all,” Gilles Deleuze 
once wrote, “or this is what it means and has 
nothing else to say: not to be unworthy of what 
happens to us.”2 “Not to be unworthy of what 
 
1 Joshua Clover, “Back to the Barricades,” Los Angeles 
Review of Books, March 6, 2016, https://lareviewofbooks. 
org/review/back-to-the-barricades. “The least miserable, 
even in the face of defeat”: perhaps this is what’s meant by 
the striking sentence with which Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri famously conclude Empire, “This is the 
irrepressible lightness and joy of being communist”: 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2000), 413. 
2 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, ed. Constantin V. 
Boundas, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale (New 
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happens to us”—a formulation as curious as it is 
imperious. What might it mean? 
 “The fact that must constitute the point of 
departure for any discourse on ethics,” Giorgio 
Agamben has contended, “is that there is no essence, 
no historical or spiritual vocation, no biological 
destiny that humans must enact or realize. This is 
the only reason why something like an ethics can 
exist, because it is clear that if humans were or had 
to be this or that substance, this or that destiny, no 
ethical experience would be possible—there would 
be only tasks to be done.”3 “This does not mean, 
however,” Agamben goes on to clarify, “that hum-
ans are not, and do not have to be, something, that 
they are simply consigned to nothingness and 
therefore can freely decide whether to be or not to 
be, to adopt or not to adopt this or that destiny 
(nihilism and decisionism coincide at this point). 
There is in effect something that humans are and 
have to be, but this something is not an essence nor 
properly a thing: It is the simple fact of one’s own 
existence as possibility or potentiality.”4   
 
York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 149. Logique du 
sens was first published in 1969. 
3 Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. 
Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1993), 43. 
4 Agamben, The Coming Community, 43, author’s empha-
sis. David Graeber, Direct Action: An Ethnography (Oak-
land: AK Press, 2009), 525–526: “One could well argue 
that if there is any human essence, it is precisely our 
capacity to imagine that we have one.” 
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 In the Compendium grammatices linguae hebrae-
ae, Agamben recounts a passage where Spinoza 
“explains,” Agamben writes, “the meaning of the 
reflexive active verb as an expression of an imma-
nent cause”5: “Se visitare, ‘to visit oneself,’ the first 
Latin equivalent that Spinoza gives to clarify the 
meaning of this verbal form […], is clearly in-
sufficient; yet Spinoza immediately qualifies it by 
means of the singular expression se visitantem 
constituere, ‘to constitute oneself visiting.’”6 What 
ethics “means” is none other, and no more, than 
“the meaning of the reflexive active verb as an 
expression of an immanent cause” (and therefore 
cannot but take its cue from Spinoza’s example): 
Ethics is that singular visitation which consists in 
constituting oneself visiting that “something” “that 
humans are and have to be”—that without which 
there would be no “ethical experience”: the “fact” 
“that there is no essence, no historical or spiritual 
vocation, no biological destiny that humans must 
enact or realize,” “the simple fact,” in other words, 
and so immanently, “of one’s own existence as poss-
ibility or potentiality.” 
 Deleuze’s formula is found in a book he 
composed in the midst (and impending aftermath) 
of the May upheavals of 1968 that shut down all 
Paris, the city in which he lived. “Not to be un-
worthy of what happens to us” (insurrection re-
stores to this Stoic dictum its true sense and 
 
5 Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Phil-
osophy, ed. and trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2000), 234. 
6 Agamben, Potentialities, 234. 
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radicality): In other words, live to warrant victory. 
Live, in case of defeat, that is, so as not to warrant 
quarter. 
 Ethics means this or it means nothing at all: not 
to be unworthy, whatever happens, of the potent-
iality that constitutes us. 
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ONE. 
 
THE UNTRANSLATABLE 
Triptych on a Sentence by Rey Chow 
 
f 
 
  
 § DICHTUNG UND WAHRHEIT 
 
Strictly speaking, does not thought—or the act of 
thinking—always have the capacity for operating 
like a foreign language?7 
 
Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur dichten. Witt-
genstein’s imperative translates, “very roughly,” “Phil-
osophy ought really to be written only as poetry.”8 
 
7 Rey Chow, Not Like a Native Speaker: On Languaging as 
a Postcolonial Experience (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 2014), 42.  
8 Ludwig Wittgenstein, quoted and translated in Marjorie 
Perloff, “‘Literature’ in the Expanded Field,” in Compar-
ative Literature in the Age of Multiculturalism, ed. Charles 
Bernheimer (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1995), 184 [175–186]. Thomas Basbøll has noted that 
Wittgenstein’s dictum “means, somewhat less elegantly 
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Yet how is one to approach that directive? How is 
one to read it—as poetry, or philosophy? If poetry, 
following Robert Frost, is, precisely, “what gets lost 
in translation,” how is one to place what’s proposed 
here? And where does that leave philosophy? 
 “Poetry may well be ‘what gets lost in trans-
lation,’” Craig Dworkin has conceded, “though the 
phrase should be understood not in the sense of 
elegiac ruination or privation, but of absorption and 
reverie—in the way one might be lost in thought.”9 
 Only in poetry lost in thought, as in another 
 
than the German, that ‘one ought really to do philosophy 
as poetry.’ The German word ‘dichten’ is the verb form of 
‘Dichtung,’ which means ‘poetry.’ To my knowledge there 
is no such thing as poeting in English”: Thomas Basbøll, 
“Epiphany,” The Pangrammaticon, June 18, 2005, http:// 
pangrammaticon.blogspot.com/2005/06/epiphany.html. “In 
any case,” Basbøll concludes, “modifying Peter Winch’s 
translation a bit, we can render this more naturally as, 
‘One ought really only to compose philosophy (as one 
composes poetry).’” 
9 Craig Dworkin, No Medium (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2013), 124. Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. Barbara 
Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 72: 
“With this problem of translation we will thus be dealing 
with nothing less than the problem of the very passage 
into philosophy.” Rémi Brague, “Europe,” in Dictionary of 
Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon, ed. Barbara 
Cassin, trans. and eds. Emily Apter, Jacques Lezra, and 
Michael Wood (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2014), 324 [323–328]: “In this history of translations, one 
paradox awaits us at the outset: the word itself that 
designates philosophy was never translated, literally 
speaking, into European languages. It is the untranslatable 
par excellence.” 
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language, may philosophy be found. 
 
§ THE UNTRANSLATABLE 
 
Strictly speaking, does not thought—or the act of 
thinking—always have the capacity for operating 
like a foreign language?10 
 
“To speak of untranslatables,” as does Barbara Cas-
sin, general editor of the Dictionary of Untrans-
latables: A Philosophical Lexicon, “in no way implies 
that the terms in question, or the expressions, the 
syntactical or grammatical turns, are not and cannot 
be translated: the untranslatable is rather what one 
keeps on (not) translating.”11 Insofar as the untrans-
latable is that which one cannot translate, it is by 
definition what one cannot help but translate. And 
yet, in translating the untranslatable—interminab-
ly—what will one have communicated? 
 However intractable “the terms in question, or 
the expressions, the syntactical or grammatical 
turns,” whatever the recalcitrance, what will have 
eluded each of the untranslatable’s multiple and 
variegated translations is, in ceaselessly inspiring 
them, the incorrigible foreignness of thought (un 
 
10 Chow, Not Like a Native Speaker, 42. Michael Bell, 
review of The Aesthetics of Argument, by Martin Warner, 
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews: An Electronic Journal, 
December 2, 2016, http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/the-aesthet 
ics-of-argument/: “The nature of thought is notoriously 
elusive.” 
11 Barbara Cassin, “Introduction,” in Dictionary of Un-
translatables, xvii [xvii–xx].  
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mirage interne des mots mêmes, as Mallarmé has 
it).12 On this point one should amend Novalis with 
the words of the German travel writer Waldemar 
Bonsels: Philosophy really is homesickness—home-
sickness for a foreign country.13 
 
§ EXILE 
 
Strictly speaking, does not thought—or the act of 
thinking—always have the capacity for operating 
like a foreign language?14 
 
Near the end of his 1975 novel Juan sin Tierra, Juan 
Goytisolo writes, Si en lo futuro escribes, será en otra 
lengua, “If you write in the future, it will be in 
another language.”15 That sentence, “like all those of 
its grammatical form,” Daniel Heller-Roazen ob-
serves, “is ambiguous”: if it’s not taken to be “a 
statement describing a state of affairs (albeit of a 
 
12 Stéphane Mallarmé, quoted in Richard Serrano, “Fans, 
Silk, and Ptyx: Mallarmé and Classical Chinese Poetry,” 
Comparative Literature 50.3 (1998): 228 [220–240]. 
13 Waldemar Bonsels, quoted and translated in John 
Zilcosky, Kafka’s Travels: Exoticism, Colonialism, and the 
Traffic of Writing (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 
4, 29, inter alia. 
14 Chow, Not Like a Native Speaker, 42. Jacques Derrida, 
Monolingualism of the Other: or, The Prosthesis of Origin, 
trans. Patrick Mensah (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1998), 40–41: “Sometimes I wonder whether this 
unknown language is not my favorite language.” 
15 Juan Goytisolo, quoted and translated in Daniel Heller-
Roazen, “Speaking in Tongues,” Paragraph 25 (2002): 108 
[92–115]. 
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particular variety in this case, being ones that have 
yet to take place),” it will be understood to be “a 
command, an imperative couched in the indicative 
mood. In the first sense,” therefore, “the words have a 
straight-forward constantive value; in the second,” 
however, “they have the form of an injunction that 
could be paraphrased as ‘if you write in the future, 
you must do so in another language,’ or, more force-
fully and fully, ‘if you write again, it cannot be as 
you have written and write now; if you write again, 
it must be otherwise, in another language.’”16 How is 
one to understand that sentence and the language in 
which it is written? By what departure will one have 
heard it for what it says? 
 “A philosopher begins by hearing his native 
language as a foreign tongue”17—and that for per-
haps no one “more forcefully and fully” than for he 
who was until then a poet: “He wrote of ‘the ancient 
 
16 Heller-Roazen, “Speaking in Tongues,” 108–109. Rebec-
ca Walkowitz, “Future Reading,” ACLA Report on the 
State of the Discipline 2014-2015, ed. Ursula Heise et al., 
http://stateofthediscipline.acla.org/entry/future-reading: “In 
the future, the future is now.”  
17 Michael Kinnucan, “Philosophy in Translation, Philo-
sophy as Translation,” Asymptote (July 2014): http://www. 
asymptotejournal.com/criticism/barbara-cassin-dictionary- 
of-untranslatables-a-philosophical-lexicon/. Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 98: “To be a for-
eigner, but in one’s own tongue, not only when speaking a 
language other than one’s own. To be bilingual, multi-
lingual, but in one and the same language, without even a 
dialect or patois.” 
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quarrel between poetry and philosophy’ precisely to 
mask the fact that philosophy did not even exist 
until he composed The Republic, where he first an-
nounces the quarrel, and that it was he who was on 
the side of the new and against the traditional.”18 
 
18 Alexander Nehamas, “An Essay on Beauty and Judg-
ment,” Three Penny Review 80 (Winter 2000): https:// 
www.threepennyreview.com/samples/nehamas_w00.html. 
John Sallis, On Translation (Bloomington: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 2002), 60: “Here for the first time the 
structure, the basic constitution, of translation is deter-
mined; here the Platonic text declares what may be called 
the protoclassical determination of translation. But in this 
determination everything depends on how the single word 
διάνοια [thought, in a word] is understood.”  
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TWO. 
 
THE THING ITSELF 
 
f 
 
  
One cannot learn philosophy, because it is not yet 
given.19 
 
“‘Philosophy’ is said in many ways.”20 Perhaps fore-
most among them philosophy may be said to be a 
question of the transformation of aporia into 
euporia. But how might aporia admit of trans-
formation? To what part of it falls, if any, its 
formulation as a question?  
 
 
 
19 Immanuel Kant, quoted in Giorgio Agamben, The 
Signature of All Things: On Method, trans. Luca D’Isanto 
and Kevin Attell (New York: Zone Books, 2009), 82, 
Kant’s emphasis. See Immanuel Kant, Logic, trans. Robert S. 
Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz (New York: Dover, 1988), 
29. 
20 Justin E. H. Smith, The Philosopher: A History in Six 
Types (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 237. 
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§ FORMS 
 
Can one speak—and if so, in what sense—of an 
experience of the aporia? An experience of the 
aporia as such?21 
 
How does one both present the analytic solution 
of a mystery and at the same time conserve the 
sense of the mysterious on which analysis 
thrives?22 
 
“In the year 529 A.D.,” Giorgio Agamben recounts, 
“the emperor Justinian, acting on the urging of the 
fanatical spokesmen of the anti-Hellenic faction, 
decreed 
 
the closure of the Athens school of philosophy. It 
thus turned out that Damascius, the incumbent 
scholarch, was the last diadoch of pagan philo-
sophy. Through friends at court he sought to 
reverse the decision. Their promises of help 
came to nothing more than the offer of a stipend 
as librarian in one of the provinces against the 
confiscation of the property and income of the 
school. The likelihood of persecution drove the 
scholarch and six of his closest helpers to load 
books and belongings on a cart and seek refuge 
at the court of the Persian king, Khosrow Anūsh-
 
21 Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. Thomas Dutoit 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 15, author’s 
emphasis.  
22 John T. Irwin, The Mystery to a Solution: Poe, Borges, 
and the Analytic Detective Story (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1994), 2.  
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irvan. Thus it came about that the purest Hellen-
ic traditions that the Greeks—or rather “Rom-
ans,” as they were then calling themselves—were 
no longer worthy of preserving, came into the 
keeping of the barbarians. 
 The diadoch was no longer young; the 
moment was long gone in which he had thought 
to concern himself with marvelous stories and 
the apparition of souls. After the first few 
months of court life at Ctesiphon, the task of 
satisfying the philosophical curiosity of the 
sovereign with commentaries and critical edit-
ions was left to his students Priscianus and 
Simplicius. Cloistered in a house in the north of 
the city with a Greek scribe and Syrian house-
keeper, Damascius determined to devote the last 
years of his life to writing a work to be entitled: 
Aporias and Solutions Concerning First Prin-
ciples.23 
 
“Tradition has it that Damascius labored on his 
work for three hundred days and as many nights, 
that is, for the exact duration of his exile at 
Ctesiphon.”24 
 
And so it was that as he was writing one night 
the image suddenly sprang to mind that would 
guide him—so he thought—through to the 
conclusion of his work. It was not, however, an 
 
23 Giorgio Agamben, “Threshold,” in Idea of Prose, trans. 
Michael Sullivan and Sam Whitsitt (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1995), 31 [31–34]. 
24 Agamben, “Threshold,” 32. 
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image, but something like the perfectly empty 
space in which only image, breath, or word 
might eventually take place. Or, rather, it was 
not even a space, but the site of a place, as it 
were, a surface, an area absolutely smooth and 
flat, on which no point could be distinguished 
from another. He thought of the white stone 
yard of the farm where he had been born, at the 
gates of Damascus, where the peasants threshed 
the wheat in the evenings to separate grain and 
chaff. Wasn’t what he was searching for exactly 
like the threshing floor, itself unthinkable and 
unspeakable, where the winnowing fans of 
thought and language separated the grain and 
chaff of everything?25 
 
What comes to Damascius is by any account a 
curious “image.” It recalls to him the threshing floor 
of “white stone” on “the farm where he had been 
born, at the gates of Damascus,” yet it is, for him, 
“unthinkable and unspeakable,” a place “where the 
winnowing fans of thought and language separated 
the grain and chaff of everything.” An “image,” 
then, that “was not, however, an image,” “some-
thing,” instead, “like” a “perfectly empty space” (one 
“in which”  “image, breath, or word might event-
ually take place”), “or, rather, it was not even a 
space, but the site of a place, as it were.” How is one 
to understand that “image”? And how might it serve 
as a “guide”? 
 The aporia attains its transformation with a 
 
25 Agamben, “Threshold,” 33. 
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vision of what may well be called philosophy’s “first 
principle.” “What is reached here, that is, is some-
thing still sensible (from this comes the term idea, 
which indicates a vision, an ἰδεῖν). But not some 
sensible thing presupposed by language and knowl-
edge, but rather, exposed in them.”26 “The thing 
itself” is thus revealed to be from the first, in so 
many words, a kind of exile. And perhaps only in 
exile is it made out: There where “the winnowing 
fans of thought and language” may in time separate 
the wheat from the chaff and yet from which, at last, 
only with difficulty can it be told apart: its story. 
 
§ THE MYSTERY TO A SOLUTION 
 
Or vice versa: Is an experience possible that would 
not be an experience of the aporia?27 
 
A solution that conserves (because it endlessly re-
figures) the sense of the mysterious.28 
 
A story, that is, that, in its telling, is at one with a 
“demand” that defines that “purest” of Hellenic 
traditions: the “unavoidable” demand, “the (endless 
and endlessly circular) demand to inherit philo-
sophy philosophically.”29 “Of course, the issue of 
how to inherit philosophy philosophically is no 
 
26 Agamben, “The Idea of Appearance,” in Idea of Prose, 
122–123 [121–123], author’s emphasis. 
27 Derrida, Aporias, 15. 
28 Irwin, The Mystery to a Solution, 2. 
29 Simon Glendinning, In the Name of Phenomenology 
(New York: Routledge, 2007), 1, author’s emphasis. 
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more decided in advance or at the outset than any 
other issue in philosophy”30 so that philosophy, as a 
tradition, may be said to be constituted by the 
question of “what (inheriting) philosophy (philo-
sophically) is.”31 How then is philosophy to be in-
herited? After what fashion, and according to what 
necessity, must the answer continue to be informed 
by the question? 
 “Close to an old, half-abandoned inn,” begins 
Malba Tahan’s version of a well-known tale, “we”—
the narrator Hanak Tade Maia and his travel com-
panion Beremiz Samir, known for his skill with 
numbers as the Man Who Counted—“saw three 
men arguing heatedly 
 
beside a herd of camels. Amid the shouts and 
insults, the men gestured wildly in fierce debate, 
and we could hear their angry cries: 
 “It cannot be!” 
 “That is robbery!” 
 “I do not agree!” 
 The intelligent Beremiz asked them why they 
were quarreling. 
 “We are brothers,” the oldest explained, “and 
we received these 35 camels as our inheritance. 
According to the express wishes of our father, 
half of them belong to me, one-third to my 
brother Hamed, and one-ninth to Harim, the 
youngest. Nevertheless, we do not know how to 
make the division, and whatever one of us 
 
30 Glendinning, In the Name of Phenomenology, 1. 
31 Simon Glendinning, The Idea of Continental Philosophy 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 120. 
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suggests, the other two dispute. Of the solutions 
tried so far, none have been acceptable. If half of 
35 is 17½, if neither one-third nor one-ninth of 
this amount is a precise number, then how can 
we make the division?” 
 “Very simple,” said the Man Who Counted. 
“I promise to make the division fairly, but let me 
add to the inheritance of 35 camels this splendid 
beast that brought us here at such an opportune 
moment.” 
 At this point I intervened. 
 “But I cannot permit such madness. How are 
we going to continue on our journey if we are 
left without a camel?” 
 “Do not worry, my Baghdad friend,” Beremiz 
said in a whisper. “I know exactly what I am 
doing. Give me your camel, and you will see 
what results.” 
 And such was the tone of confidence in his 
voice that, without the slightest hesitation, I gave 
over my beautiful Jamal, which was then added 
to the number that had to be divided between 
the three brothers. 
 “My friends,” he said, “I am going to make a 
fair and accurate division of the camels, which, 
as you can see, now number 36.” 
 Turning to the eldest of the brothers, he 
spoke thus: “You would have received half of 
35—that is, 17½. Now you will receive half of 
36—that is, 18. You have nothing to complain 
about, because you gain by this division.” 
 Turning to the second heir, he continued, 
“And you, Hamed, you would have received 
18 PHILOSOPHY FOR MILITANTS 
	
one-third of 35—that is, 11 and some. Now you 
will receive one-third of 36—that is, 12. You 
cannot protest, as you too gain by this division.” 
 Finally, he spoke to the youngest: “And you, 
young Harim Namir, according to your father’s 
last wishes, you were to receive one-ninth of 35, 
or 3 camels and part of another. Nevertheless, I 
give you one ninth of 36, or 4. You have bene-
fitted substantially and should be grateful to me 
for it.” 
 And he concluded with the greatest con-
fidence, “By this advantageous division, which 
has benefitted everyone, 18 camels belong to the 
oldest, 12 to the next, and 4 to the youngest, 
which comes out to—18 + 12 + 4 = 34 camels. Of 
the 36 camels, therefore, there are 2 extra. One, 
as you know, belongs to my friend from Bagh-
dad. The other rightly belongs to me for having 
resolved the complicated problem of the inheri-
tance to everyone’s satisfaction.” 
 “Stranger, you are a most intelligent man,” 
exclaimed the oldest of the three brothers, “and 
we accept your solution with the confidence that 
it was achieved with justice and equity.” 
 The clever Beremiz, the Man Who Counted, 
took possession of one of the finest animals in 
the herd and, handing me the reigns to my own 
animal, said, “Now, dear friend, you can con-
tinue the journey on your camel, comfortable 
and content. I have one of my own to carry me.” 
 And we traveled on toward Baghdad.32  
 
32 Malba Tahan, The Man Who Counted: A Collection of 
Mathematical Adventures, trans. Leslie Clark and Alastair 
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“Clever,” indeed.  How is one to understand the 
intervention of the Man Who Counted in the “fierce 
debate” between the three brothers over the division 
of their inheritance? To what part of it falls that 
addition—the narrator’s camel—that turns out to be 
no addition at all? 
 Gabriel Marcel opposes the problematic to the 
mysterious. Whereas a problem, for Marcel, “is 
something met with which bars my passage,” and is 
thus “before me in its entirety,” a mystery is 
something whose “essence” precludes its ever being 
at once, “in its entirety,” “before me”: it’s rather 
“something in which I find myself caught up.”33 So 
perhaps problem need not be opposed to mystery 
after all—perhaps that’s what the ingenious Beremiz 
can be understood to demonstrate. If the proble-
matic is resolved in the mysterious that’s because it’s 
into its solution, as into a mystery, that those whom 
a problem has gathered all with advantage depart. 
 
Reid (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1993), 11–13. 
33 Gabriel Marcel, Being and Having, trans. Katherine 
Farrer (Boston: Beacon Press, 1951), 100. 

	
 
 
 
 
 
 
THREE. 
 
THE RETURN TO PHILOLOGY 
 
f 
 
  
What happens is parting. [Was geschieht, ist Ab-
schied.]34 
 
A well-known story relates that when an editor (as 
tradition has it, Andronicus of Rhodes) came, some 
centuries after Aristotle’s death, to produce the first 
complete edition of the Philosopher’s works, the 
volume of fourteen books following those com-
prising the volume on nature, the Physics, bore a 
designation that in time became a word unknown to 
the Philosopher himself: “metaphysics,” from ta 
meta ta phusika, literally, “the after the physicals,” 
or, more idiomatically, “the ones after the physical 
ones,” “the ones,” the books, “after the ones about 
physics.”35 “Whether or not the story is true,” one 
 
34 Werner Hamacher, Minima Philologica, trans. Cath-
arine Diehl and Jason Groves (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2015), 37. 
35 Peter van Inwagen and Meghan Sullivan, “Metaphys-
ics,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 
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scholar has commented, in an authoritative volume 
on the history of metaphysics, “the name is pecul-
iarly apt”: “For ‘meta’ can also be translated either as 
‘above’ or as ‘beyond,’ and metaphysics is often 
reckoned to lie at a level of generality above and 
beyond physics. Come to that, it is often reckoned to 
be a subject that should be studied ‘after’ physics.”36 
However meta may be translated, whatever interval 
it may insinuate, whether “after,” “above,” or “be-
yond,” how is place to be understood in the word, 
no less than in the title, Metaphysics? What bearing 
will that initial designation be said to have had on 
the “subject” that it names, and how will one have 
come to situate—to read—the intervention of the 
editor in having supplied it? How, in short, is one to 
understand the “aptness” of that title in all its 
“peculiarity”? 
 In a 1798 fragment Friedrich Schlegel defined 
philology in passing as the “counterpart” (Seiten-
stück) of philosophy.37 Philosophy, from the same 
root, may perhaps be said to be in turn the “meta-
physics” of philology. 
 It will be recounted that Aristotle had no one 
word for metaphysics. In truth, he had more than 
one. “Aristotle himself described what he was un-
dertaking in that volume as ‘first philosophy,’ or as 
 
Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/spr2015/entries/metaphysics/.  
36 A. W. Moore, “Preface,” in The Evolution of Modern 
Metaphysics: Making Sense of Things (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2012), xvii [xvii–xxi]. 
37 Friedrich Schlegel, quoted and translated in Hamacher, 
Minima Philologica, 25, 125. 
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the search for the first causes and the principles of 
things, or again as the science of being qua being.”38 
“These descriptions,” the scholar goes on to com-
ment, “variously indicate both the fundamental 
character of his undertaking and its abstractness.”39 
That the Philosopher’s undertaking in the Meta-
physics may be characterized as both “fundamental” 
and “abstract” makes the following all the more 
striking: “In its approach, the volume was a 
miscellany. It comprised historical and methodo-
logical reflections, a survey of problems and aporiai 
to be addressed, and a philosophical lexicon, as well 
as direct treatment of its main topics, which in-
cluded substance, essence, form, matter, individu-
ality, universality, actuality, potentiality, change, 
unity, identity, difference, number, and the prime 
eternal unmoved mover (God).”40 What is to be 
made of the fact that, despite its “fundamental 
character” and “abstractness,” metaphysics—what 
Aristotle called “‘first philosophy,’” “the search for 
the first causes and the principles of things,” “the 
science of being qua being”—has never been 
anything other than variegated? However “direct” it 
may be said to be, not least in the “treatment” of “its 
main topics,” Aristotle’s curious volume, in its 
“approach,” was “a miscellany.” How is one to un-
derstand that “approach”? How is one to approach 
it? 
 “There could be no philology were tradition not 
broken,” Daniel Heller-Roazen has observed, “no 
 
38 Moore, “Preface,” xvii. 
39 Moore, “Preface,” xvii. 
40 Moore, “Preface,” xvii. 
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field of textual interpretation, criticism, and study 
were the transmission of texts not already obscure, 
altered, and interrupted: the immediacy and trans-
parency of understanding would forbid the con-
stitution of a discipline of the study of the language 
of the past.”41 At root, philosophy and philology are 
bound by a shared condition of possibility, one 
which neither, as a “field,” can leave behind, yet one 
with which neither, in its “transmission,” can be 
identified: “already obscure,” “altered” from the 
outset, and there, as by an incipient perplexity, by an 
uncertain interval “interrupted,” “immediacy and 
transparency of understanding” “would forbid the 
constitution” of the one no less than the other. That 
“interpretation, criticism, and study” are necessary, 
however, is bound to “forbid,” in addition, that that 
be all. Philosophy and philology are each coex-
tensive with the “interruption” they constitute and 
with which, at the limit, they nonetheless do not co-
incide: “immediacy and transparency of under-
standing” “would forbid” each, no less than its 
“constitution,” its possession of a “past”—a past 
that, as such, had gone unthought and until then 
unremarked. A single consequence follows, a singu-
lar complication. There could be no metaphysics 
were there nothing “broken,” no “tradition” of 
metaphysics were not its medium, its very element, 
on each approach, wanting. Wanting, strangely, the 
question of metaphysics is therefore not, in truth, 
 
41 Daniel Heller-Roazen, “Tradition’s Destruction: On the 
Library of Alexandria,” October 100 (Spring 2002): 151 
[133–153]. 
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one. Metaphysics is a question of first philosophy. 
Then philology. 

	
 
 
 
 
 
 
FOUR. 
 
THE LION AND THE BALL 
On the Secret of Language 
 
f 
 
  
Language is not contiguous to anything else. We 
cannot speak of the use of language as opposed to 
anything else.42 
 
We learn to learn from the singular and the un-
verifiable.43 
 
 
To conclude his discussion of an essay by a ninth-
 
42 Ludwig Wittgenstein, quoted in Marjorie Perloff, “Writ-
ing Philosophy as Poetry: Literary Form in Wittgenstein,” 
in The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, eds. Oskari 
Kuusela and Marie McGinn (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 719 [714–728]. Wittgenstein’s emphasis. 
Daniel Heller-Roazen, Dark Tongues: The Art of Rogues 
and Riddlers (New York: Zone Books, 2013), 9: “‘Lan-
guage,’ however, was and remains an obscure word.” 
43 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial 
Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 145n49. 
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century Iraqi writer, “The Guarding of the Secret 
and the Holding of the Tongue,” Daniel Heller-
Roazen concedes, “Al-Jāḥiẓ, to be sure, limits his 
reflections to matters that one can conceal, and that 
one ought, for this reason, to keep under lock and 
key. On the subject of the repository of all human 
secrets, which no one owns, 
 
the author holds his tongue. At the risk of 
peering into that guarded common coffer and 
imagining something where there is nothing, 
one can, however, pose this question: might 
language guard something of its own, hidden in 
everything that is said? Might there be a cryptic 
thing in speech, distinct from the many matters 
that one can also store in it? […] The secret of 
language would be neither of something nor of 
someone. No skill of speech, therefore, could 
master it. Yet it would be discernible to the ear 
and to the eye, even as it accompanied all the 
motions of the tongue and pen, not least the one 
that brings them, at the crucial moment, to a 
halt.44 
 
The early ‘Abbāsid essayist “limits his reflections to 
matters that one can conceal,” but “on the subject of 
the repository of all human secrets, which no one 
owns”—in a word, language—“the author holds his 
tongue.” How is one to characterize that act of 
 
44 Daniel Heller-Roazen, The Secrets of al-Jāḥiẓ / Die 
Geheimnisse des al-Jāḥiẓ (Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz Verlag, 
2012), 11. 
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discretion? What, in its very reserve, will it have 
disclosed? 
 According to the seventeenth-century Chinese 
critic Jin Shengtan, writing is successful when, “first 
fixing one’s attention on a point, one turns the 
paintbrush all around this point while letting it 
evolve continuously.”45 The late Ming writer offers 
an image in illustration: 
 
This entirely resembles the lion that rolls the 
ball at the circus. It is only the ball that 
matters, but it allows the lion to use all of his 
agility. In an instant, everyone in the arena 
watching the lion is dazzled. But the lion is not 
directly concerned: the people stare at the lion, 
but he stares at the ball. What is thus whirling 
around is the lion, but what makes him whirl 
around in every direction is always the ball.46 
 
That around which every such motion turns, no less 
than that whose position, as its accompaniment, 
limns each continuously evolving movement, might 
the “point” central to all eloquence in the remark of 
the Chinese critic suggest the darkling figure of that 
“cryptic thing” exposed, in language, by all the 
subtlety of that protective tact to which the Iraqi 
essayist had not failed to hold? Perhaps no more, on 
 
45 Jin Shengtan, quoted and translated in François Jullien, 
Detour and Access: Strategies of Meaning in China and 
Greece, trans. Sophie Hawkes (New York: Zone Books, 
2000), 336. 
46 Jullien, Detour and Access, 336. 
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one pass, than this side of an instant’s dazzling 
brush with it. 
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIVE. 
 
PLACE WITHOUT DESCRIPTION, OR, 
THINKING WITH POEMS 
 
f 
 
  
It is not a question of thinking “about” poems but 
with poems.47 
 
A great provocation to thought: what might it be to 
think “with” poems? No doubt there are many and 
illustrious examples of thinking “about” poems, in 
 
47 Judith Balso, Affirmation of Poetry, trans. Drew S. Burke 
(Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing, 2014), 17, author’s 
emphasis. Alain (Émile-Auguste Chartier), quoted and 
translated in George Steiner, The Poetry of Thought: From 
Hellenism to Celan (New York: New Directions, 2014), v: 
“Every thought begins with a poem,” such that what we 
call a “poem,” Derrida writes, “does not hold still within 
names, nor even within words.” Jacques Derrida, “Che 
cos’è la poesia?” in A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds, 
trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1991), 229 [221–237]. 
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the variegated corpus of writing comprising the 
tradition of literary criticism, for one. But are there 
any examples, in the critical tradition or beyond, of 
thinking with them? After what fashion, in line with 
what criteria, might thinking be said to accord with 
poems? And what might thinking with poems afford 
thought? 
 Because it is indeed, as Balso has it, “a quest-
ion”: How is one to place thought? Might not what’s 
in question for thinking here reveal something es-
sential to what it is to place in question—something 
essential, that is, to place in question? 
 
§ ONTOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES CONFRONT US 
 
Ontological difficulties confront us with blank 
questions....In each case the observable phenom-
enon—the text—is the inevitable betrayal, in both 
senses of the term, of an invisible logic.48 
 
Indeed much of our own trouble has already been 
taken before we are in a position to know whether 
questions of this kind are present in the poems at 
all.49 
 
In De Anima, in an inquiry into “the sensation of 
the senses themselves,” Aristotle writes “what is 
sometimes darkness and sometimes light is one in 
nature” and asks what, in the case of vision, permits 
 
48 George Steiner, “On Difficulty,” The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 36.3 (Spring 1978): 273, 276 
[263–276], author’s emphasis. 
49 Malcolm Bowie, Mallarmé and the Art of Being Difficult 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), x. 
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darkness to be distinguished from light.50 In other 
words he poses the question: What does one see 
when one sees darkness? 
 
§ THIS VOID IS, HOWEVER, NOT A NON-BEING 
 
This void is, however, not a non-being; or at least 
this non-being is not the being of the negative, but 
rather the positive being of the “problematic,” the 
objective being of a problem and of a question.51 
 
To understand a question means to ask it.52 
 
An exemplary poem begins, “In a field / I am the 
absence / of field.” The speaker contends, with the 
very next line, that this “is always / the case”: 
“Wherever I am / I am what is missing.” 
 The poem is titled, “Keeping Things Whole.” In 
keeping with the poem’s titular interest, what’s to be 
made of the division that delimits that “absence”: 
the division of speaker from field, of field from 
speaker? What would it be, instead—in accordance 
with what will “always” have been “the case,” but 
differently—to be wholly a part of that field, to be of 
 
50 Aristotle, quoted and translated in Agamben, Potential-
ities, 180–181. 
51 Gilles Deleuze, Desert Islands: And Other Texts, 1953-
1974, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Melissa McMahon, 
Charles J. Stivale, Michael Taormina, et. al. (New York: 
Semiotext(e), 2004), 189–190. 
52 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel 
Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Con-
tinuum, 2004), 368. 
34 PHILOSOPHY FOR MILITANTS 
	
a piece with it and nothing apart from it? How 
might one think it? How might one write it? 
 
§ CONSCIOUSNESS CEASES TO BE A LIGHT 
 
Consciousness ceases to be a light cast upon 
objects in order to become a pure phosphor-
escence of things in themselves.53 
 
The idea of paper.54 
 
Que la blancheur défend, writes Mallarmé: which 
defends itself by its own whiteness.55 
 
§ IT IS NOT WITHOUT REVERENCE 
 
It is not without reverence that we reduce.56 
 
By process of elimination, one is no longer 
anything more than an abstract line, or a piece in 
a puzzle that is itself abstract.57 
 
What do we see when we read but letters? But how 
 
53 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 311. 
54 Nicholas Basbanes, On Paper: The Everything of Its Two-
Thousand-Year History (New York: Vintage Books, 2013), 
xii. 
55 Stéphane Mallarmé, quoted and translated in Henry 
Weinfield, “Commentary: Poésies,” in Stéphane Mallar-
mé, Collected Poems: A Bilingual Edition, trans. Henry 
Weinfield (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 
164 [147–241], right column. 
56 Peter Mendelsund, What We See When We Read (New 
York: Vintage Books, 2014), 414. 
57 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 280. 
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do the shapes of letters in turn shape reading? 
 Here limit may be distinguished from boundary, 
“for limit, like shape, belongs primarily to what is 
limited and only secondarily to what does the 
limiting,” whereas “to be a boundary, by contrast, is 
to be exterior to something or, more exactly, to be 
around it, enclosing it […]. As such, a boundary 
belongs to the container rather than to the 
contained.”58 A question as complicated as it 
appears simple: Is the letter a boundary or a limit? 
What—and how—does it “belong” to it to “contain”? 
(When Agamben once more invokes the Spinoza of 
the Compendium grammatices linguae hebraeae, in a 
decisive passage in the final volume of the Homo 
Sacer series, it’s to note “this peculiar situation,”59 “a 
singular topology”60: With reading we seem to have, 
 
58 Edward Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical 
History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 
63, author’s emphasis. 
59 Giorgio Agamben, The Use of Bodies, trans. Adam 
Kotsko (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), 27. 
60 Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 28. “Only a philosophical 
topology, analogous to what in mathematics is defined as 
an analysis situs (analysis of site) in opposition to analysis 
magnitudinis (analysis of magnitude) would be adequate 
to the topos outopos, the placeless place whose Borromean 
knot we have tried to draw in these pages. Thus topo-
logical exploration is constantly oriented in the light of 
utopia.” Giorgio Agamben, quoted in Peter Fenves, 
“Wither Topology? On Structure and Order in Homo 
Sacer,” Stanford University Press [weblog], July 6, 2016,  
http://stanfordpress.typepad.com/blog/2016/07/whither-
topology.html. Hence, Fenves concludes, “a non-quanti-
fiable and non-orientable ‘situs’ consisting of an un-
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in Émile Benveniste’s striking formulation, “a 
process that takes place in the subject: the subject is 
internal to the process.”61) 
 What’s required, Deleuze and Guattari write, is 
“much asceticism, much sobriety, much creative 
involution.”62 They take as their example “the 
camouflage fish, the clandestine”: “this fish  
 
is crisscrossed by abstract lines that resemble 
nothing, that do not even follow its organic 
divisions; but thus disorganized, disarticulated, 
it worlds with the lines of a rock, sand, and 
plants, becoming imperceptible. The fish is like 
the Chinese poet: not imitative or structural, but 
cosmic. François Cheng shows that poets do not 
pursue resemblance, any more than they calcu-
late ‘geometric proportions.’ They retain, extract 
only the essential lines and movements of na-
ture; they proceed only by continued or super-
posed ‘traits,’ or strokes.63 
 
In short, and in a “movement” nothing less than 
“cosmic,” “one reduces oneself to one or several 
abstract lines that will prolong itself in and con-
 
bounded and thus ‘infinite’ surface, with only a single side 
and therefore, in effect, without any (opposing) sides at 
all. In short, a ‘bare’ opening, from which a series of other 
such openings can be envisaged.” 
61 Émile Benveniste, quoted and translated in Agamben, 
The Use of Bodies, 27. 
62 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 279. 
63 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 280. 
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jugate with others, producing immediately, directly 
a world in which it is the world that becomes.”64 
 
§ A WORLD IN SHORTHAND 
 
A world in shorthand.65 
 
The sum of whose movements are known only in 
obscurity.66 
 
In the commentary he appends to his Jin dynasty 
recension of the Zhuangzi, and in attempting to 
reconcile ostensibly discordant statments on the 
value of knowledge made in the course of its dis-
parate chapters, Guo Xiang recommends an 
approach to knowing he places in contrast to cog-
nition, a thought one scholar has rendered “vanish-
ing into things.”67 The character Guo employs here 
as a verb, ming (冥), could be said more colloquially 
 
64 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 280, 
authors’ emphasis. 
65 Leibniz, quoted and translated in Daniel Heller-Roazen, 
The Inner Touch: Archeology of a Sensation (New York: 
Zone Books, 2007), 193.  
66 Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. 
Tom Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1993), 86. 
67 Barry Allen, Vanishing into Things: Knowledge in 
Chinese Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2015), 103–104. The translation is Brook Ziporyn’s. See 
Brook Ziporyn, “Interactivity Without Traces: Vanishing 
(Into) Things,” in The Penumbra Unbound: The Neo-
Daoist Philosophy of Guo Xiang (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 2003), 65–83. 
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to mean dark, obscure, or difficult to discern, so that 
as a transitive verb, in accordance with Guo’s use of 
it, it means “to darken,” “to darken” its object.68 
 What might it mean as an instigation to thought 
that the verb rendered “vanishing,” in the phrase 
“vanishing into things,” is indistinguishable by sight 
from one that means to “darken” them? 
 
§ BETWEEN THE BLANK PAGE AND THE INK 
 
That writing necessitates the creation of a series of 
antitheses between the blank page and the ink that 
divides it up is clear.69 
 
More explicit than the experience of sun.70 
 
A brilliant line from a late Byzantine lexicon reads, 
“Aristotle was the scribe of nature who dipped his 
pen in thought.”71 No less luminous—nor less re-
vealing, here—is Giorgio Agamben’s comment on it: 
Blank, incandescent, thought attains its articulation 
on vanishing into (as though an afterimage) “the ink 
of its own opacity.”72 
 
68 Allen, Vanishing into Things, 104. 
69 Richard E. Goodkin, The Symbolist Home and the Tragic 
Home: Mallarmé and Oedipus (Philadelphia: John Benja-
mins Publishing Company, 1984), 21.   
70 Wallace Stevens, “Description without Place,” in The 
Palm at the End of the Mind: Selected Poems and a Play, 
ed. Holly Stevens (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), 276 
[270–277].  
71 Suda, quoted and translated in Agamben, Potentialities, 
214. 
72 Agamben, Potentialities, 215.  
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§ EVERYTHING THUS HAPPENS FOR US 
 
Everything thus happens for us as though we 
reflected back to surfaces the light which emanates 
from them, the light which, had it passed on un-
opposed, would never have been revealed.73 
 
“Poetry no longer imposes itself,” in thinking with 
poems instead of about them, as Paul Celan writes, 
“it exposes itself.”74 
 
73 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. N.M. Paul 
and W.S. Palmer (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 36. 
74 Paul Celan, quoted and translated in Agamben, Potent-
ialities, 115. 

	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SIX. 
 
“UTOPIA IS THE VERY TOPIA OF THINGS” 
On Parables 
 
f 
 
 
Many complain that the words of the wise are 
always merely parables and of no use in daily life, 
which is the only life we have. When the sage says: 
“Go over,” he does not mean that we should cross 
to some actual place, which we could do anyhow if 
the labor were worth it; he means some fabulous 
yonder, something unknown to us, something too 
that he cannot designate more precisely, and 
therefore cannot help us here in the very least. All 
these parables really set out to say merely that the 
incomprehensible is incomprehensible, and we 
know that already. But the cares we have to strug-
gle with every day: that is a different matter. 
 Concerning this a man once said: Why such 
reluctance? If you only followed the parables you 
yourselves would become parables and with that 
rid of all your daily cares. 
 Another said: I bet that is also a parable. 
 The first said: You have won. 
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 The second said: But unfortunately only in 
parable. 
 The first said: No, in reality: in parable you 
have lost.75 
 
“If you only followed the parables,” it has been 
written, “you yourselves would become parables.” 
How is one to understand “follow” here? “The 
words of the wise are always merely parables,” 
“many complain” in the parable’s opening words, 
“and”—are therefore, it’s implied: something of 
consequence is to follow—“of no use in daily life, 
which is the only life we have.” For “when the sage 
says: ‘Go over,’ he does not mean that we should 
cross to some actual place, which we could do any-
how if the labor were worth it; he means some 
fabulous yonder, something unknown to us, some-
thing too that he cannot designate more precisely, 
and therefore”—my emphasis—“cannot help us here 
in the very least.” 
 How is one to follow that? 
 “If you only followed the parables you yourselves 
would become parables and with that rid of all your 
daily cares.” Because as opposed to parables—as 
opposed, that is, to “some fabulous yonder,” “some-
thing unknown to us”—“the cares we have to strug-
gle with every day: that is a different matter.” Yet to 
be “rid” of them? By “becoming” parables? 
 
75 Franz Kafka, The Complete Stories, ed. Nahum N. 
Glatzer, trans. Willa Muir, Edwin Muir, Tania Stern, 
James Stern, Ernst Kaiser, and Eithne Wilkins (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1971), 457. The title comes from Agam-
ben, The Coming Community, 103. 
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 “I bet that is also a parable.” 
 “Also” a parable? What does that also insinuate 
here? 
 Parables, since they are “of no use” there, are 
opposed throughout the body of Kafka’s parable to 
“daily life,” “the cares we have to struggle with every 
day.” But in the parable’s final line parable is 
opposed to “reality.” There’s an easy equivalence in 
daily life between “daily life” and “reality.” And by 
opposing parable to each—to “daily life” and to 
“reality”—Kafka seems to confirm that synonymy. 
Yet what Kafka does in reality is confirm it in 
parable. Parable insinuates between “daily life” and 
“reality”—and here is its “use,” the care it demon-
strates—the “merest” divergence (“the words of the 
wise are always merely parables”) by opposing each 
in turn, first one, then the other. So that one no 
longer follows from the other. Not as it does so 
easily, so carelessly, as in (thus) “daily life.” 
 To have thus discreetly introduced a certain 
“reluctance.” 
 Thus (also) “the words of the wise.” 
 “All these parables really set out to say merely 
that the incomprehensible is incomprehensible, and 
we know that already.” And yet, between “the in-
comprehensible,” which we “know” “already” (“the 
incomprehensible is incomprehensible,” that’s “all 
these parables really set out to say,” “merely,” “and 
we know that already”), and what no one has any 
doubt the sage “means” (“when the sage says: ‘Go 
over,’ he does not mean that we should cross to 
some actual place,” but “some fabulous yonder, 
something unknown to us”), perhaps there’s located 
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“something” that can, in fact, be “designated more 
precisely”: Between the “unknown” and “the in-
comprehensible,” in short, how is one to situate 
thought in parable? How is one to place it? And 
conversely, unavoidably: How, in parable, is one to 
understand place? 
 Nor least: What follows? 
 “Follow” translates Kafka’s folgen, so that one 
could also translate it, “If you only obeyed the 
parables....” 
 To the question, “Why such reluctance?” 
(“Concerning this a man once said: Why such 
reluctance? If you only obeyed the parables....”), one 
can therefore only reply: Obey? What would it be to 
obey—or for that matter, to disobey—parables? And 
so ask, for that reason, What would it be to obey 
parables only, exclusively? (“If you only obeyed the 
parables....”) 
 So as then to have followed, or perhaps obeyed, 
observed, on so uncertain a terrain, a certain un-
translatability. 
 What’s lost thereby? 
 What won? 
 The title of the parable is “On Parables.” Parable 
is where the stakes are set, where Kafka sets down 
stakes. (“I bet that is also a parable.”) That the stakes 
are set in parable does not mean that the fallout can 
in consequence be limited to it. It is in “the only life 
we have” and so making of it in its recounting “a 
different matter” that parable is what “On Parables” 
will have—with the most scrupulous and uncanny 
care—gone over. You follow? You yourselves be-
come parables. 
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
POSTFACE. 
 
“TO BELIEVE IN THIS WORLD” 
Immanence and Militancy 
 
f 
 
 
One can just as easily become a convinced Spinoz-
ist (or a firm opponent) with a materialist and 
atheistic interpretation of the Ethics as with a 
mystical-religious one.76 
 
A problem of economy and strategy.77 
 
“Spinoza began with God!”78 Louis Althusser ex-
claims. “A supreme strategy”—“the extreme essence 
 
76 Jean-Luc Marion, quoted in Knox Peden, Spinoza Con-
tra Phenomenology: French Rationalism from Cavaillès to 
Deleuze (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 1. 
The title is a line from Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The 
Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 172. 
77 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan 
Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 282. 
78 Louis Althusser, “The Only Materialist Tradition, Part I: 
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of every philosophical strategy,”79 Althusser even 
goes on to say—“he began by taking over the chief 
stronghold of his adversary, or rather he established 
himself there as if he were his own adversary, 
therefore not suspected of being the sworn adver-
sary, and redisposed the theoretical fortress in such 
a way as to turn it completely around, as one turns 
around cannons against the fortress’s own occu-
pant.”80 
“A supreme strategy,” “the extreme essence,” 
even, “of every philosophical strategy,” Althusser’s 
brilliant observation draws a decisive question 
sharply, if quietly, into focus: What is the sense and 
value of “strategy” in philosophy, and how is the 
indiscernibility of the “materialist” and “atheistic” 
and “mystical-religious” interpretations of the Ethics 
of a piece with it? In other words, what does that 
indiscernibility delimit? What line of demarcation 
does it trace? 
 
§. THE FIRE AND THE TALE: ON INEFFABILITY AND 
PHILOSOPHY 
 
Riddles are a truer representation of the nature of 
reality than simple declarative statements.81  
 
Spinoza,” in The New Spinoza, eds. Warren Montag and 
Ted Stolze, trans. Ted Stolze (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997), 10 [3–19]. 
79 Althusser, “The Only Materialist Tradition, Part I: 
Spinoza,” 11. 
80 Althusser, “The Only Materialist Tradition, Part I: 
Spinoza,” 10–11. 
81 Adam Roberts, The Riddles of The Hobbit (New York: 
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“What cannot be told of, we want to know, knowing 
also,” as Arthur Danto put it, “that we cannot say: 
the ineffable is that about which all that is to be said 
is that nothing more is sayable.”82 “Still,” Danto goes 
on to say, “one persists in wanting to know, there 
must be some explanation.”83 “What cannot be told 
of, we want to know, knowing also that we cannot 
say”—and “still, one persists.” How might one 
understand that persistence? How does it figure 
wanting into knowledge, and how might this be said 
to find in “the ineffable” its articulation? 
 In The Way of Zen, Alan Watts recounts an 
apposite mondō. 
 
Fa-yen asked the monk Hsüan-tzu why he had 
never asked him any questions about Zen. The 
monk explained that he had already attained his 
understanding from another master. Pressed by 
Fa-yen for an explanation, the monk said that 
when he had asked his teacher, “What is the 
Buddha?” he had received the answer, “Ping-ting 
T’ung-tzu comes for fire!” 
     “A good answer!” said Fa-yen. “But I’m sure 
you don’t understand it.” 
     “Ping-ting,” explained the monk, “is the god 
of fire. For him to be seeking for fire is like 
 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 20.  
82 Arthur Danto, quoted in Silvia Jonas, Ineffability and its 
Metaphysics: The Unspeakable in Art, Religion, and Philo-
sophy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 3. 
83 Danto, quoted in Jonas, Ineffability and its Metaphysics, 
3. 
48 PHILOSOPHY FOR MILITANTS 
	
myself, seeking the Buddha. I’m the Buddha 
already, and no asking is needed.” 
     “Just as I thought!” laughed Fa-yen. “You 
didn’t get it!” 
     The monk was so offended that he left the 
monastery, but later repented of himself and 
returned, humbly requesting instruction. 
     “You ask me,” said Fa-yen. 
     “What is the Buddha?” inquired the monk. 
     “Ping-ting T’ung-tzu comes for fire!”84 
 
When it comes to the ineffable perhaps the least that 
can be said with any certainty must respect the need 
for asking after it: “Is it credible that we can be 
satisfied with a tale that is no longer”—the monk’s 
placid explanation—“in relation with the fire?”85 
Strictly speaking, and however paradoxical, it goes 
without saying: the identification of the monk with 
the fire god (and so with the Buddha) obtains only 
in inquiry—in a “seeking” where “asking,” in fact, 
“is needed.”86 Only on asking after the Buddha, in 
 
84 Alan Watts, The Way of Zen (New York: Vintage Books, 
1989), 128. Dale S. Wright, Philosophical Meditations on 
Zen Buddhism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 99: “I take this to be the impact of the saying 
thought to have awakened Zen master Fa-yen: the posture 
of ‘“not knowing” most closely approaches the truth.’” 
Note, this places Fa-yen’s reply, “But I’m sure you don’t 
understand it”—and therefore the entire exchange—in a 
very different light. 
85 Giorgio Agamben, The Fire and the Tale, trans. Lorenzo 
Chiesa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017), 2.  
86 André Jolles, Simple Forms: Legend, Saga, Myth, Riddle, 
Saying, Case, Memorabile, Fairytale, Joke, trans. Peter J. 
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other words, can the monk be said to have “come for 
fire.” And only on asking again, and so having 
“repented of himself,” may he therefore yet come for 
the first to be consumed by it. 
 
§. “THE HITHER SIDE OF ALL SOLUTIONS”: THE PLACE 
IN PLACE OF CONCLUSION 
 
Rationality is not a problem. There is behind it no 
unknown quantity which has to be determined by 
deduction, or, beginning with it, demonstrated 
inductively. […] The world and reason are not 
problematical. We may say, if we wish, that they 
are mysterious, but their mystery defines them: 
there can be no question of dispelling it by some 
“solution,” it is on the hither side of all solutions.87  
 
If we wish to say, after Spinoza, that philosophy is 
mysterious, that’s because what began with God 
didn’t end there: what the Ethics co-opts in the last 
instance and above all, definingly, is mystery, infil-
trating it and redisposing it in the name of philo-
sophy itself.88 The “turn” Spinoza effects follows “as 
if he were his own adversary”: “Immanence” is no 
 
Schwartz (New York: Penguin, 2017), 106: “From this,” in 
short, “we can conclude that the sole or true point of the 
riddle is not the solution itself, but rather the act of 
solving.” 
87 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 
trans. Colin Smith (New York: Routledge, 2003), xxiii.  
88 In Spinoza’s words, that is, what we have is “the crys-
talline elimination of the unsayable in language.” Walter 
Benjamin, quoted in Agamben, Potentialities, 54.   
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solution89—the hither side of all solutions, it betrays 
its impassable designation for the ruthless criticism 
of everything existing. 
 
 
 
 
 
89 Jonathan Lear, Happiness, Death, and the Remainder of 
Life (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 
161: “What we need to grasp is not another place but a 
peculiar kind of possibility: the possibility of disrupting 
the field of possibilities.” 
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W. dreams, like Phaedrus, of an army of thinker-friends, 
thinker-lovers. He dreams of a thought-army, a 
thoughtpack, which would storm the philosophical 
Houses of Parliament.He dreams of Tartars from the 
philosophical steppes, of thought-barbarians, thought-
outsiders. What distances would shine in their eyes! 
 
~Lars Iyer 
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Figure 1. Phillip Igumnov, “Cloud Makers” (2010).

	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
